Hussain Mohi-ud-Din Qadri
Of late, the news of engaging the Taliban leadership in talks with the consent
of the United States has surfaced. There are now credible reports that the US is
busy talking to the much feared Haqqani network based in North Waziristan. This
demonstrates a clear departure from the earlier policy of dictating terms of engagement
with the Taliban premised on the assumption that the surge of the US troops would
break the back of Taliban thereby forcing them ‘to beg for peace’.
The thrust of ‘surge and exist strategy’ announced by the Obama administration
in December 2009 was on using the military muscle to flatten the terrorists before
moving ahead with the negotiation process. Obama’s policy on how to approach the
endgame in Afghanistan sought to reconcile tangible refits within his administration.
The surge option was advocated by the US military commanders, while the anti-surge
camp led by Vice President Joe Biden emphasized the need for limited counterinsurgency
operations based on the use of CIA-operated drones and Special Operation Forces.
In an attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable and reflect stance of both side
in a consensus policy on Afghanistan, President Obama fixed the July 2011 for the
withdrawal of the US combat mission adding a caveat that the fighting capacity and
number of the Afghan army would be enhanced to enable it to replace the US forces
besides urging the Karazi administration to bring about reforms in the governmental
structure.
It is often said that plans and strategies worked out in war rooms often do not
get implemented on the battlefield. Situation on the ground shapes its own dynamics
and sets the agenda for the warring parties to respond to. Since the day one when
the US president launched his policy on Afghanistan, it was said to be a failure
waiting in the wings to mark the US war effort. The policy only reflected lack of
direction characterized by contradictions and intense policy rifts between the military
commanders and the civilian leadership. It was said to be a non-starter and has
proven to be so in the first place.
A Guardian’s editorial of October 7 describes the situation thus, “There is a
clear and pressing need to end the monumental folly of prosecuting a war in Afghanistan.
It is spreading in intensity into the tribal areas of Pakistan and could yet rattle
a weak civilian government in Islamabad to bits.” The increase in the number of
drone attacks in the North Waziristan and subsequent Pakistani response of halting
the NATO supplies through Turkham border has exposed the myth of deepening strategic
relationship between Washington and Islamabad. To all intents and purposes, it largely
remains a tactical and need-based relationship bereft of any deeper understanding
on mutual issues.
Though the Pakistani government has ordered the reopening of the border for transportation
of the NATO supplies after both NATO and the US government tendered public apologies
over the helicopter incursions into the Pakistan territory, which resulted in the
deaths of three Pakistani soldiers, the relationship between the so-called war allies
remains fraught with tensions and policy rifts. These apologies might have served
to cool down the raging anger for a while; however, there is a clear clash of interests
between Pakistan and the US. The short-term tactical objectives of the United States
are at odds with the long-term strategic objectives of Pakistan in Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s security establishment is rightly worried over the situation in Afghanistan
after the withdrawal of the US. Given the huge economic constraints further exacerbated
by the history’s worst floods, Pakistan ill-affords to face two hot fronts, one
in the East and other in the West.
The increase in the number of drone strikes over the border areas of Pakistan
and shifting of war theatre from Afghanistan to North Waziristan may be necessitated
by the urgent need to show results to the war-weary American public that the surge
strategy is bearing fruit. It may also be an effort on the part of US and ISAF commander,
General David Patraeus, to thwart Obama’s plan to start withdrawing the US forces
from July 2011 by constructing a false notion of ‘victory’. There have also been
contradictory statements on and the differing interpretations of what the US President
meant by July 2011. Did he mean to start the actual withdrawal of the US combat
mission by this date, come what may, or was he referring to it tentatively by way
of spurring efforts to wind up the United States engagement in Afghanistan? The
upcoming mid-term elections in November might also have catalysed the recent surge
in strikes over Pakistan’s borderland in an attempt to deflate the impression built
by Obama’s Republican political adversaries that he was not a war president.
The Obama administration’s Af-Pak strategy is a stark failure and does not stand
any chance of success. Instead of containing terrorism, it has further fuelled its
intensity. The White House assessment sent to the US Congress coupled with disclosure
of WikiLeaks some time ago raises serious doubts about the loyalty and intensions
of Pakistan in prosecuting war against the Taliban. Despite tall claims by both
sides, there is no institutional arrangement capable of harmonizing their differing
viewpoints into an integrated policy.
The US is adamant on continuing with its present Af-Pak policy and shuns any
notion of engaging with the Taliban publicly. This is the impression one gets from
the President Obama’s statement wherein he said, “We are continuing to implement
the policy as described in December and do not believe further adjustments are required
at this time.”
However, internally there is now a gradual change of heart in Washington with
increasing realization of negotiated settlement of what has been termed as the most
intractable oversees engagement of the US. The Obama administration can make much
needed mid-course correction in the upcoming policy review in December by aligning
discordant elements into a cohesive line of action in the light of the lessons learnt
over the year. The success or failure of the policy review depends on a large part
to addressing the Pakistani concerns and apprehensions. It remains to be seen whether
Obama possesses the ability to walk the talk.
The writer is Australia-based PhD candidate
